Overemphasizing automatic, dispositional cognitive processes, research on social fields has tended to undertheorize the active, reflective dimensions of cognition that shape practice. This has occurred, at least in part, as a reaction to the overly instrumentalist premises of rational action theory. But redressing the errors of an excessively instrumentalist notion of action by overemphasizing the automatic nature of cognition leaves us with a similarly inadequate understanding of how cognition works to influence practice in a field and, as a consequence, the ways in which change may occur from pressures originating within the field itself. In this article, we draw from data on cognition and practice in two kinds of fields-a sexual and a culinary field-to demonstrate how inherent structural pressures encourage instances of deliberate nondispositional cognition and practice. These data suggest an expanded model of practice in field theory that moves beyond a dual-process model of cognition and toward a more nuanced understanding of the relationship of automaticity and deliberation, and habituality and nonhabituality, in the routine practices of a field.
. The diversity of such work aside, field approaches in the social sciences are united by the axiom that practices are accounted for by one's position vis-à-vis others in social space, less as a function of a force relation than the result of the overarching logic of the field itself (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008; Martin 2003) . Here, unlike the actions of elements in the biosphere (e.g., the falling of a snowflake within the earth's gravitational field), human action within a social field requires cognition. That is, field practice is premised on the notion that actors somehow-implicitly, imperfectly-discern what criteria matter (i.e., the rules of the game), how these criteria are distributed across the field (i.e., the dispersion of capital between field positions), and where they stand in relation to other players within the stratification system (i.e., their relative field position). 1 Prior sociological research on fields and field theory has focused heavily on the macrolevel structure of fields and field formation, including the development of organizational and cultural fields (see DiMaggio 1991a DiMaggio , 1991b DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Emirbayer and Johnson 2008; Ferguson 1998 Ferguson , 2004 Frickel and Gross 2005; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003) , but has, by and large, not focused on how actors cognize their social environment, make sense of it, and develop strategies of action (but see Green 2011; Leschziner 2007b) . Instead, field theoretical work typically relies on Bourdieu's (cf. 1977 Bourdieu's (cf. , [1979 1984) concept of habitus to do the micro-level work-a schema for action that represents the subconscious, somatic incorporation of social structure. To be sure, Bourdieu's formulation of the habitus has been an invaluable contribution, not least because it has pushed the discipline to transcend longstanding dualisms, in particular those of structure/agency and objectivism/subjectivism. However, we believe that reliance on the habitus has led to two principal shortcomings in field theory. First, in the absence of a sufficient analysis of deliberate cognition, field theory is plagued by a "thinking problem." Overemphasizing automatic, dispositional cognitive processes, field research has tended to undertheorize the subtle, fluid interplay between automatic and reflective forms of cognition that attend most social actions (Bourdieu 1993 (Bourdieu , [1992 (Bourdieu ] 1996 Powell 1983, 1991; Lizardo 2004; Vaisey 2009; Zucker 1977 Zucker , 1987 but see Elder-Vass 2007) . 2 We believe this theoretical inattention has occurred, in part, as a reaction to the overly instrumentalist premises of rational action theory (Gray 1987; Hechter 1994; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997; Wrong 1997) . But redressing the errors of an excessively instrumentalist notion of action by overemphasizing the automatic nature of cognition leaves us with a similarly inadequate understanding of how actors cognize their social contexts to delineate paths of action and a myopic view of the forces that drive practice in a field. 3 In contrast, we suggest that insofar as fields are contested and changing structural configurations, they regularly militate against dispositional practice alone. 4 That is, because of their very nature, fields encourage deliberate as well as automatic cognition, which combine in nuanced and complex ways as actors apprehend and negotiate their positions in social space.
Second, we contend that an overreliance on the habitus brings the subsequent problem of explaining field change. While field theory provides useful tools for explaining social reproduction within a given social configuration, it is limited in the degree to which it can account for change (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012b) . 5 To the extent that field theory posits a one-to-one congruence between field and habitus, this is not surprising. In this formulation, change emerges from outside the field, in exogenous phenomena such as a global fiscal crisis or a political revolution (i.e., phenomena that fundamentally recalibrate existing relations) (see Ferguson 1998 Ferguson , 2004 Rao et al. 2003) . 6, 7 Yet these kinds of transformations, while great in magnitude, provide only a partial account of how fields change. Bound to the habitus like a ball to a chain, field theory has few tools to account for internally wrought and incremental changes that are likely to characterize most field transformations, such as those that accrue from the active cognition and nonhabitual practices of field agents. Thus, we argue that the "thinking problem" in field theory not only limits insight into the micro-level, cognitive processes that shape individual practice, it also tends to obfuscate explanation of field change originating from within the field.
In this article, we draw from original ethnographic research of two very different kinds of fields-a sexual field and a field of high cuisine-to illustrate some of the regularly occurring pressures that encourage deliberate cognition and nonhabitual practice. The contrasting nature of these fields, namely, the distinct domains of life to which each refers (i.e., love and work), their differing degrees of formal institutional organization, and the variability in the stability of their respective field positions, make these two cases especially productive for thinking about cognitive processes in fields more generally. From these cases, we find that active, reflective forms of cognition and practice occur not only in times of major field transformation but as a typical component of routine practice. We highlight here these deliberate dimensions of action not to foster yet another dichotomous model for understanding action but because it is in the realm of reflective action that the recent field theoretic literature has been most inattentive. In turn, these cases provide key insights for redressing the "thinking problem" in field theory and, by extension, the problem of field change. They also highlight the principle that very little action is purely deliberate or automatic (Evans 2006) but, rather, depends upon hierarchies of automaticity and deliberateness (Elder-Vass 2007) that emerge within the context of any given practice in a field. 8 Thus, we engage with research into social cognition, and in particular "dual-process" models of cognition (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Haidt 2001 Haidt , 2005 Wegner and Bargh 1998) , 9 as well as with pragmatist theories of action (Dewey [1939 (Dewey [ ] 1967 (Dewey [ , [1922 (Dewey [ ] 2002 Joas 1996; Whitford 2002) to argue that deliberate cognition and nondispositional practice are not only not unusual in a field, they are in fact quite likely to occur alongside automatic cognition and dispositional practice as actors respond to the structural pressures inherent to the nature of fields and delineate paths of action. 10 It follows that the possibility of field transformation need not rest on exogenous factors alone but, rather, should be formulated as an ever present possibility within the routine practices that constitute the field itself.
Toward this end, in the sections that follow we outline the broad tenets of field theory, especially as developed by Bourdieu; review findings from research into social cognition that are particularly relevant to field theory; and sketch the terms of our analytic framework. In two subsequent empirical sections we draw on pragmatist insights to examine instances in sexual and culinary fields wherein actors engage in practices that involve a response to immediate pressures from the field, as well as the routine "muddling along" (Dewey [1939 (Dewey [ ] 1967 (Dewey [ , [1922 2002) in the day-to-day experience of being a player in the field. A discussion section brings the findings of our research to bear on field theory and underscores the need for a theory of action that provides for the proper place of reflective cognition and action. We conclude the article with a discussion of the implications of our argument.
FIELD THEORY: FIELD, CAPITAL, HABITUS
That field theory would enjoy such widespread application in disciplines ranging from business administration to cultural studies is undoubtedly attributable to Bourdieu's formulation of field, capital, and habitus-the conceptual foundation of his theory of routine practice (Brown and Szeman 2000; Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone 1993) . While not without critics (Alexander 1995; King 2000 ), Bourdieu's framework has been used to analyze fields of cultural production (Bryson 1997; Ferguson 1998; Leschziner 2010; Pinheiro and Dowd 2009; Rocamora 2002; van Rees and Dorleijn 2001) , education systems and their relationship to social stratification (Dumais 2002; Harker 1984; Nash 1990) , consumption patterns (Holt 1998; Lizardo 2006; Warde, Martens, and Olsen 1999) , the nature of professional arenas (Wacquant 2004; Widick 2003) , and the social organization of sexuality (Green 2008a (Green , 2008b Hennen 2008; Martin and George 2006; Prieur 1998) , to name only a few areas of investigation. Below, we provide a brief outline of the main concepts of Bourdieu's theoretical framework (but see Bourdieu 1977 for a comprehensive rendering).
A field is a socially structured space composed of situated agents, institutionalized practices, and an overarching logic or regulative principle (cf. Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) . Fields are relatively autonomous configurations insofar as the logic of action is internally constituted rather than externally compelled. Actors in a field acquire shared understandings of its stakes, pursuing strategies of action that preserve or transform their positions vis-à-vis one another. In turn, the boundaries of the field itself are never ossified but remain dynamic and subject to change (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Martin 2003) .
Field players are positioned in social space relative to their power, or, in the Bourdieusian lexicon, capital. Capital confers legitimacy and prestige upon actors within a given field and may be used in the struggle to improve field position. As such, capital acquisition is itself a stake in the struggle (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) . But to the extent that fields are distinguished by their own particular organizing logic and regulative principle, capital comes in different forms or, in Bourdieusian terms, species (see Bourdieu [1992 Bourdieu [ ] 1996 . Hence, what serves as capital in one field may not in another. Economic capital, for instance, serves as a resource of primary importance in an economic or political field but may work against the agent in a field of artistic production, such as a poetry field (Craig 2007) , where financial wherewithal and legitimate artistry are anathema to one another (Bourdieu [1992 (Bourdieu [ ] 1996 . Similarly, cultural capital may put a middle-class high school student at great advantage relative to working-class peers when applying to college, but it will confer little advantage in the boxing ring (Wacquant 2004) .
Nevertheless, their relative autonomy aside, fields may be connected to one another by virtue of the interconvertibility of one species of capital to another. Hence, while economic capital is not reducible to cultural capital, the former is convertible to the latter insofar as money can buy seats at elite boarding schools, summers abroad learning foreign languages, or expensive after-school programs in music and art appreciation (Cookson and Persell 1985) . Similarly, social capital is not reducible to economic capital, and yet the former is convertible to the latter, as when the graduate of an elite law school has at her disposal alumni at top corporate law firms offering both employment and large salaries with robust bonus structures.
But according to Bourdieu, field and capital alone are not enough to understand the forces that shape practice in the field. This is because, for Bourdieu, the logic of practice is reducible neither to individual, rational calculation, such as that proposed by rational actor models (Becker 1976; Coleman 1994; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997) , nor to the internalization of values and norms, as suggested by traditional social learning models (cf. Parsons 1964) . Rather, Bourdieu draws from a range of sources from classical sociology to developmental psychology (see Lizardo 2004) , to complete the conceptual arsenal of his logic of practice with the concept of the habitus.
The habitus is a mental structure that represents the objectification of social structure at the level of the agent's subconscious (cf. Bourdieu 1977) . It consists of durable and transposable dispositions and schemas (Bourdieu 1977) . The habitus operates in at least two related ways: as a perceptual and classifying structure and as a structure that generates practical action. Because both capacities are organized by the social structural location in which an agent is socialized, the schematic and action-generative properties of the habitus closely correspond to the external conditions of their emergence. 11 Put differently, actors pursue lines of action generated by subconscious, automatic cognitive processes (see D'Andrade 1995; Haidt 2001) based in previously constituted perceptual schemata and routinized lines of action.
It is important to underscore that the linkages among field, habitus, and practice in Bourdieu's theory emphasize social reproduction. 12 Indeed, in this account, only when a field is already in the process of transformation such that the previous homologous relationship between the habitus and the structure of the field is disrupted will actors encounter conditions conducive to thinking outside the schematic structure of the habitus, and here still only for a segment of field players (see Lizardo and Strand 2010) . In sum, field theory has little place for deliberate, nonautomatic cognition in the course of routine practice and, as a consequence, little capacity to theorize change that originates from within the field itself. Instead, deliberate, reflective cognition is largely sequestered to conditions of fundamental field transformation, with the latter arising not from the changing practices of field agents but from the impact of exogenous factors and circumstances on the field. The extent to which actors rely on deliberate thinking along with more automatic forms of cognition and action, and the extent to which field change can arise from within the field itself, are ultimately empirical questions. But they are questions that cannot be addressed without a more thorough understanding of how cognition works in routine practice. To this end, we begin by outlining the notion of cognitive schemas as elaborated in the cognitive psychology literature and then briefly review dual-process models of cognition. As we will show, the notion of cognitive schemas and dual-process models of cognition build on one another and have important theoretical implications for unpacking the concept of the habitus and understanding cognition and practice in fields.
COGNITIVE RESEARCH: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIZING COGNITION AND PRACTICE IN A FIELD
The notion of cognitive schemas has been increasingly used in the sociology of culture in recent years (DiMaggio 1997 (DiMaggio , 2002 Zerubavel 1997) , but it has been used in two different ways. While many sociologists conceptualize schemas as classifications of phenomenastatic representations that individuals have in their minds (see DiMaggio 1997)-others follow cognitive psychology to conceive of schemas as processing mental devices (Cerulo 2006 (Cerulo , 2010 DiMaggio 1997 DiMaggio , 2002 Lizardo and Strand 2010; Martin 2010; Vaisey 2009 ). In this view, schemas are active tools whereby individuals obtain information from the environment and organize it to create a complex model that allows them to delineate possibilities for future action (see D'Andrade 1992 D'Andrade , 1995 . D'Andrade (1992) defines schemas especially clearly:
To say that something is a "schema" is a shorthand way of saying that a distinct and strongly interconnected pattern of interpretive elements can be activated by minimal inputs. A schema is an interpretation which is frequent, well organized, memorable, which can be made from minimal cues, contains one or more prototypic instantiations, is resistant to change, etc. While it would be more accurate to speak always of interpretations with such and such a degree of schematicity, the convention of calling highly schematic interpretations "schemas" remains in effect in the cognitive literature. (p. 29) Here, the particular schemas individuals rely upon are not the product of deliberate choice but are selected through a process that is largely automatic and subconscious. 13 For our purposes, three aspects of cognition commensurate with this view are of particular relevance: (1) cognitive schemas are triggered by environmental inputs and influence one another; (2) cognitive schemas constitute flexible structures of thoughts and ideas rather than fixed rules for action; and finally, (3) motivations and emotions, not just external stimuli, thoughts and ideas, also shape cognition. It follows that a fair degree of individual variation in the workings of cognition should be expected (D'Andrade 1995:149) .
While the idea that schemas operate not as fixed sets of rules but as flexible structures that recognize and respond to external stimuli (see Strauss and Quinn 1997 ) is reminiscent of the habitus, the two differ in important ways. One of the most important differences is that whereas the habitus is conceived of as a unified, comprehensive cognitive structure presumed to account for all cognition and action, the notion of schemas, as elaborated above, does not exhaust the range of processes that make cognition possible. Some mental operations follow what are called serial symbolic processes, through which inputs are turned into symbols in the brain. Importantly, whereas schemas are associated with automatic thinking, serial symbolic processes tend to occur with deliberate thought (see Lieberman 2007:261) . Put differently, while many cognitive psychologists argue that the bulk of cognition occurs through automatic associations (see D'Andrade 1995:140-41), they note that there are also conscious modes of cognition and knowledge (see D 'Andrade 1995:144-45) . This is, in other words, a dual model of cognition.
The notion of a duality in cognitive processes has not gone unnoticed by sociologists (see Chaiken and Trope 1999; Haidt 2001 Haidt , 2005 Wegner and Bargh 1998 ; for its use in sociology, see Vaisey 2008a Vaisey , 2008b Vaisey , 2009 . Drawing from experimental research into cognition (see Bargh 1994; Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Zajonc 1980) , dual-process models maintain that most cognition is automatic and based on quick judgments, that is, a feeling of what is right or wrong. This follows the premise that deliberate thinking is cognitively uneconomical, given that actors cannot possibly contemplate every single action they undertake in everyday life. In contrast to theories that assume that actors consciously consider goals and values before acting-a paradigm that can be traced back to the work of Parsons (1937) -dual-process models hold that individuals are only likely to switch to deliberate thinking when automatic cognition becomes ineffective, e.g., when they are faced with a new situation. In other words, so long as individuals are not especially motivated to use reasoning, they will follow their intuitions through automatic, quick and effortless cognitive processes to make decisions (see Haidt 2001) . Here, individuals do not rely on reasoning to motivate action but, rather, use reasoning to create post hoc justifications of actions, or put in analogous terms, they rely on a vocabulary of motives (Mills 1940) . 14 That actors do not necessarily have conscious access to the thought processes through which they make decisions (unless especially motivated) but, rather, follow a sense of what is right or wrong in choosing a path of action is consistent with the sociological notion of habitus, whereby individuals select paths of action subconsciously, driven by incorporated and embodied schemas and dispositions. Indeed, recent work inspired by field theory (see Lizardo and Strand 2010; Vaisey 2009 ) draws on the consistency between this theory and dual-process models to further Bourdieu's emphasis on the automatic nature of action. But arguing that actors have an incorporated sense of how to act in given circumstances and that they rely on intuitions to select paths of action (i.e., what "feels right" on the basis of their quick judgments, as dual-process models contend, or on their sense of objectively feasible options given their social positions, according to Bourdieu's field theory) ought not to be taken to mean that actors only select paths of action through processes that are automatic and subconscious. 15 This would reduce our understanding of cognition to a single mode, thereby jettisoning the insights gained from dual-process models over previous unidimensional theories of social learning (see Bandura 1977) or models of rational action (see Becker 1976; Coleman 1994 ). On the contrary, it is our contention that an actor's arrival at a given path of action, even when the actor is placed in a social environment with relatively stable conditions (normal field conditions of routine practice), can be expected, in some instances, to arise out of a complex combination of reflective and automatic cognitive processes. 16, 17 While much of cognition may be automatic, we should be cautious not to underestimate the weight of deliberate thinking in everyday life. To advance this point, in the following section we offer a working typology of practices.
PRACTICE AND COGNITION IN A FIELD: CLARIFYING THE TERMS OF ANALYSIS
Because practice may be conceived at both the level of the field and the level of the individual, we draw attention here to a set of critical conceptual distinctions that underpin our discussion. First, we distinguish practices at the level of the field as routine or nonroutine and practices at the level of the individual as habitual or nonhabitual. 18 Second, we distinguish cognitive processes, always at the level of the individual, as deliberate or nondeliberate. Combined, these variations produce eight possible types of practices (see Table 1 ). Since the focus of this article does not permit an exhaustive discussion of all eight forms of practice, we derive them here for analytic purposes and then use data to flesh out one particular set of relationships: the case of deliberate cognition and nonhabitual practice (at the level of the individual) in the context of routine practices (at the level of the field).
At the level of the field, practices may be characterized as either routine or nonroutine. Routine practices represent a repertoire of intelligible, effective forms of action and are to be expected under normal field conditions. In fields of cultural production, for instance, we observe routine practices when agents operate with a widely shared set of schemas regarding, say, how to render a proper portrait on a canvass or how to promote their own poetry. Practices may be characterized as nonroutine at the level of the field when they are not widely perceived as acceptable ways of conducting given actions, or even cognized as possible lines of action. In a political field, for instance, practices are nonroutine in times of revolution, when elite alliances break down, old institutional orders and ideologies are disrupted, and new strategies of political action abound and are in flux.
Practice at the level of the field has its analogue at the individual level, where it may take either habitual or nonhabitual forms. Habitual practices are those lines of action that are so familiar to an agent that they require little if any attention in the process of enactment. When an elite chef, for instance, prepares the same salmon poached in vegetable stock and wine night after night, year after year, she relies on a set of habitual culinary practices to the extent that preparing and plating the dish requires little thought. Here, the making of a poached salmon is akin to a professional cyclist riding a bike, the latter whose bodily movements, by virtue of repeated practice, have become automatic. By contrast, nonhabitual practices are Mistake those lines of action that an actor conducts in an unusual way, either because she knowingly undertakes a line of action that departs from habitual practice, or does so unaware of it (by "mistake"). Hence, in the first instance, the elite chef may consciously choose to eliminate wine from the poaching liquid for the salmon, or in the second instance, she may inadvertently forget to add the wine (i.e., a mistake) but then decide that the salmon is better this way, thus innovating on her recipe. At the individual level, cognition may be distilled into two forms: deliberate and nondeliberate. Deliberate cognition is that form of nonautomatic cognition whereby an agent draws upon consciously held ideas about a given practice, rather than on intuitions or subconscious dispositions. By contrast, nondeliberate cognition is automatic because actors draw upon existing, subconscious schemas, intuitions, and dispositions. 19 For instance, an upper-middle-class high school student may require very little forethought to choose to pursue university education when she reaches her senior year. While surely the process of selecting an appropriate university program will require deliberate thinking, the idea of applying for university education is likely to represent a dispositional line of action for which little contemplation is necessary. By contrast, when a poor inner-city high school student reaches his senior year, the decision to pursue university education may be anything but automatic. Financial obstacles and the absence of parental, sibling, and peer postsecondary educational attainment can all serve to make the decision difficult, fraught with uncertainty, and therefore a line of action requiring much deliberate thinking, if the idea is to be deliberated upon at all.
When considered in relationship to one another, routine/nonroutine practice at the level of the field, habitual/nonhabitual practice at the level of the individual, and deliberate/ nondeliberate cognition at the level of the individual produce qualitatively distinct lines of action, enumerated below. Taken together, four possible combinations of individual-level cognition and practice in the context of routinized field practices arise.
Routine Field Practices
As illustrated in Table 1 , working from the bottom left corner up, when an individual engages in a practice that is both nondeliberate and habitual (at the level of the individual), and which is part of the set of widely shared, institutionalized routine practices in the field, one has the classic Bourdieusian actor. When this same actor, however, makes a conscious decision to follow an existing practice (e.g., an elite chef who ponders removing wine from the poaching liquid but then decides not to), he has engaged in nonautomatic, deliberate cognition but followed habitual practice.
When an individual acts dispositionally, following habitual practice but, by accident, departs from the prior practice, one has a mistake. However, when an actor consciously decides on a strategy of action that is new to her, though one that is part of the widely shared repertoire of actions in the field, then one has a deliberate and nonhabitual practice (at the level of the individual) that is routine at the level of the field-that is, the topic of this article (in boldface type in Table 1 ). The elite chef who chooses not to add wine to the poaching liquid is an example of this type of practice.
Nonroutine Field Practices
When fields are in flux and there exist few if any institutionalized, routine practices, such as may be the case in times of revolution within a political field, or in the interstices between great art movements in a field of cultural production, or at the onset of HIV/AIDS within a sexual field, individuals may still engage in nondeliberate cognition and habitual practices.
Here, however, former practices that articulated with the structure of the field now fail to resonate with changing conditions, and one has a kind of Rip Van Winkle effect. Like Rip Van Winkle, who slept through the American Revolution but nevertheless continued to proclaim his loyalty to King George III, the Bourdieusian actor who acts dispositionally and habitually in times of field change is largely unaware of the conditions of transformation. However, when an actor is aware of field change but consciously decides to act habitually, one has the old guard that refuses to abandon long-held practices in the struggle to maintain tradition. Finally, as in times of institutionalized, routine field practice, in times of field change, when an individual relies on automatic cognition to produce a line of action but ends up conducting a line of action that is unintended, one has a mistake. By contrast, in this latter context, when an actor consciously follows a path of action that is novel to her, one has an attempt at innovation.
Having provided a conceptual enumeration of cognition and practice as these combine in the context of routine and nonroutine field practices, we turn below to two empirical investigations of how actors engage in deliberate cognition and nonhabitual practices by drawing from the routine practices of the field. In doing so, we argue that this kind of active, reflective cognition and practice is not unique to these cases but, quite the contrary, is to be expected alongside more automatic and dispositional forms of cognition and practice given the structural pressures common to all fields.
THINKING ABOUT SEX: COGNITION AND PRACTICE IN THE SEXUAL FIELDS OF A GAY ENCLAVE
Anyone who has spent one night in a gay bathhouse knows that it is . . . one of the most ruthlessly ranked, hierarchized and competitive environments imaginable. Your looks, muscles, hair distribution, size of cock and shape of ass determined exactly how happy you were going to be during those few hours, and rejection, generally accompanied by two or three words at most, could be swift and brutal, with none of the civilizing hypocrisies with which we get rid of undesirables in the outside world. (Bersani 1987:206) Sexual sociality in large, urban gay centers across North America and Western Europe puts in high relief the phenomenon of sexual stratification. As Bersani (1987) notes above, settings such as a gay bathhouse sort sexual actors into a vertical relation of positions by virtue of characteristics that include body type, physical attractiveness, and even the size of the genitals. While levels of sexual competition are not constant across settings, and indeed, the bathhouse in Bersani's account represents but one end of a continuum of fields of sexual sociality, the evaluation of others on the basis of physical and affective characteristics is part and parcel of life in a sexual field (Green 2011; Green forthcoming) . But urban gay enclaves provide only one example of sexual stratification, the latter which cuts across social cleavages and appears in both homosexual and heterosexual social worlds (Farrer 2010; Laumann et al. 2004 ). The insight has been picked up by sociologists who have recently sought to make sense of sexual stratification through a Bourdieusian, field theoretic approach (Farrer 2010; Green 2008b, forthcoming; Martin and George 2006; Weinberg and Williams 2009 ). This literature conceptualizes collective sexual life as a composite of sexual fields, each organized by its own particular set of "interlocking institutions" (Martin and George 2006:124) and "hegemonic systems of judgment" (p. 126).
A sexual field is an arena of institutionalized relations in which actors vie for sexual partnership and social significance (Green 2008b; Martin and George 2006) . Anchored to physical and virtual sites such as bars, bathhouses, coffee shops, nightclubs, and Internet chat rooms, sexual fields materialize wherever sexual desirability operates as an institutionalized principle of stratification. In such settings, actors occupy a position in the status order via economic and symbolic capital, but perhaps most important, via sexual capital (Green 2008b; Martin and George 2006; Weinberg and Williams 2009) . Derived from field-specific logics of attractiveness, sexual capital is a resource acquired through at least three dimensions of the self, namely, physical appearance, affect, and sociocultural style (Fitzgerald 1986; Green 2008b; Levine 1998) . Those who possess sexual capital have greater command of the sexual field than those who lack it, including the ability to attract desired and desirable partners, an increased sense of social significance and sense of control and a greater capacity to take charge of and negotiate sexual interactions (Armstrong, Hamilton, and Sweeney 2006; Green 2008b; Murray and Adam 2001) . And yet, because sexual social life accommodates a variety of logics of desirability, there exists not one sexual field but many in the North American urban gay enclave we concentrate on here-"the Village" 20 -each with its own particular norms of attractiveness and corresponding status orders. Thus, we refer to a spectrum of sexual fields in the Village wherein characteristics such as age, body type, and race are differentially valued. Here, in the context of routine practices at the level of the field, individual actors engage in cognition and practices that show a complex interplay of automaticity and deliberation, habituality and nonhabituality, respectively.
In our ethnographic work on gay and bisexual men in the Village, we find that the men who possess sexual capital have easier access to bars and nightclubs than those who do not, and are clearly favored in the course of interaction. As the individual below observes, the consequences of sexual status in a sexual field produce actors inclined to reflectively evaluate their own sexual capital and corresponding field position.
I have the sense that these kind of people that embody the ideal are more desired, so they are picking up more. . . . I have the sense that these guys are more sexually desirable and therefore more people speak to them. Versus me, I feel like I am kind of sidelined. . . . I think it's a sense to what degree that person embodies a sexual power, or a sexual vitality. . . . Going somewhere and being cruised. Going somewhere and having someone trying to pick you up. . . . People wanting your phone number, people wanting to be your friend. Strangers striking up conversations with you. . . . And they never seem to be the last left in the club. (Bradley, 32 years old, white) Desirable men, however, are not randomly distributed in the population. Rather, characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and age shape the contours of sexual stratification within any given field, thereby tying sexual capital to broader regularities in the social structure (Green 2008b; Han 2008; Poon and Ho 2008) . For instance, as the man below observes, race typically makes it easier for white men to find intimate partners than their Asian counterparts.
Larry:
In the top of the [pecking] order, it would be younger guys and dress up quite fashionably. Usually white. Has to be very good looking and good body . . . Interviewer: . . . How do you know this? Larry:
Mostly observation and, also, when I hang out with my friends and my one good friend is white and gay. So, when he tries to pick up, I can see how well he does in the bars, in clubs. I guess my friend, I can describe him as average, a bit better looking than average, but not too well looking, so sometimes he is quite successful in picking up. (Larry, 26 years old, Asian)
If those who possess sexual capital have the power to attract the attention and esteem of actors in a given sexual field, those without it encounter the problem of invisibility, social marginality, and even stigmatization over the course of interaction (Armstrong et al. 2006; Green 2008b; Han 2008; Nemoto et al. 2003) . Hence, here, as in any field, capital is often part of the struggle itself. Accordingly, actors are motivated to cultivate sexual capital through a variety of techniques, ranging from the adoption of a fitness regime or a new diet to the use of Botox and breast implants. Indeed, while some characteristics that bear on sexual capital are largely immutable and not readily manipulated-including racial appearance, height, and bone structure-other characteristics, such as clothing style, the shape of the body, hair style, affect, dialect, and even eye color are amenable to manipulation. Analytically, the practice of attending to one's appearance is routine at the level of the field to the extent that the gay sexual fields of the Village anchor status so tightly to physical and affective attributes. Yet how one manipulates one's appearance (i.e., the specific things one does in preparation to "play" the field [Green 2011 ] may be distinguished at the individual level along hierarchies of automaticity and habituality, revealing paths of action that rest intermittently on automatic cognition and habitual practices, on one hand, and deliberate cognition and nonhabitual practices, on the other.
To be sure, not all actors of a sexual field share the same degree of investment in field status. Nevertheless, the fact of sexual stratification itself, be it in a gay bar, a coed "party scene," or a barn dance in the countryside, provides an important structural backdrop against which individual cognition and practice are configured. While some actors obtain a high standing within a sexual field with relatively little effort or awareness, becoming smooth, virtuosic "players" (or in contemporary parlance, what might be called a player with game), others struggle to obtain social significance, occupying only a marginal position within a field. In either case, both dispositional and deliberate cognition are in evidence as actors apprehend the fact of stratification in the social worlds they inhabit.
AUTOMATIC COGNITION AND HABITUAL PRACTICE IN THE SEXUAL FIELDS OF AN URBAN GAY ENCLAVE
The Village is a hub of gay social life attracting a broad queer public, from city locals in search of a place to socialize with friends and to meet same-sex intimate partners to visitors who wish to experience a large urban gay scene. While there is a diversity of sexual social life within the Village, it is not unlimited. In fact, here, four core sexual fields organize gay male sexual social life and can be keyed, roughly, to the following sexual types: the leather man, the bear, the twink, and the jock. 21 Each field possesses its own sexual status order, including a favored sociodemographic profile and erotic theme. Variation in sexual capital shapes the extent to which a given individual will exercise command of a given sexual field. Those who are conversant with the dominant currency of sexual capital in a given field may come to embody it, acting in an automatic, habitual manner. Thus, the man below does not need to think about how to appeal to others-his appearance and affect are now on autopilot, requiring minimal if any active cognitive work. Accordingly, he seems unaware that while his sexual capital is acquired, in part, by dint of his youth and ethnicity (i.e., immutable characteristics), it is in fact not reducible to this. Rather, his choice in clothing and shoes, the gold rope chain he wears around his neck, the tan he maintains throughout the cold winter, and the baseball cap worn backward on his head have all become automatic and habitual, rendering him a "delicacy" in the Village. 22
Tony:
I've met people just walking down the street. Like I'm standing on the corner and they're standing across from me and it's been like, "Alright, just come back to my place. Becoming a "delicacy" in the sexual field is, typically, a process that occurs over time. In this case, positive, affirming interactions in collective sexual life establish the conditions under which an actor may become a virtuosic player (i.e., a natural "match" with the field) including an intuitive sense of the reigning logic of desirability, an embodiment of those modes of self-presentation and affect that confer sexual capital in the field, and a habitual ease of purpose that makes an actor all the more desirable to others.
In contrast, were an overweight Italian man, or a visibly effeminate Italian man, or an Italian man who does not broadcast an athletic disposition, to socialize in the same sexual field as Tony, he would likely experience a sexual capital deficit, unable to articulate with the field's logic of desirability. Similarly, when a twink begins to age out of his mid-20s or develops a bald spot, or when a jock loses his musculature or develops a double chin, both field players are likely to hold themselves up as objects of reflective consideration, not the least because reception from other agents in the field will change. That is, slowly but surely, others will be less likely to initiate conversation, or buy them drinks, or receive their approaches amicably. In these conditions, actors may respond to their changing status in highly deliberate ways as they develop new strategies of action, such as developing a new front (Goffman 1959) or finding a more accommodating sexual field in which to socialize. Alternatively, they may "muddle about" (Dewey [1939] 1967), uncertain how to change their social fate until a particularly negative experience of rejection prompts a decisive response. These are the occasions of deliberate cognition and nonhabitual practice at the individual level, a phenomenon we discuss below.
DELIBERATE, NONHABITUAL, ROUTINE PRACTICE IN THE SEXUAL FIELDS OF AN URBAN GAY ENCLAVE
Across sexual fields, it is common for actors to observe that aging erodes sexual capital, particularly in the context of the twink sexual field and, to a lesser extent, the jock sexual field. As a consequence, the once virtuosic twink will at some point find himself aging out of high status. In these instances, actors are obliged to take stock of both their sexual interests and their physical and affective characteristics in a reflective process of repositioning themselves in collective sexual life. If some actors become resigned to a diminished field position, others develop lines of action to buffer what they perceive to be eroding sexual capital. For instance, the respondent below is concerned to compensate for recent loss in muscular definition, including special "pump-ups" and a carefully selected t-shirt. Put differently, while attentiveness to appearance is routine at the level of the field, preparation for a night out shows instances of both automatic and deliberate cognition, along with both habitual and reflective practices, particularly as this actor works to mitigate his potential diminished appeal and sustain his field position.
I always trim my chest and armpits, so they're trimmed. . . . And this is going to sound so stupid, but sometimes I'll do, like, push-ups and stuff, to try to, like maybe it will give me a little bit more shape or something, because I've lost a lot of that shape that I used to have. . . . So this weekend I wore a muscle shirt that's quite-because I'm pretty thin-so I wear a muscle shirt that's quite taut to my body. And I did that purposefully, because I thought that might attract somebody, as opposed to wearing something like this, for example, like the baggy shirt. (Alex, 37 years old, white) For Alex, trimming his body hair is a habitual practice commensurate with the field-level routine practice of careful attention to appearance. However, on this particular weekend, Alex scrutinized his wardrobe in an act of deliberate cognition, producing a line of action that is both habitual at the level of field practice (i.e., using wardrobe to maximize attractiveness) and nonhabitual insofar as his recent weight loss called for renewed attention to offset his diminishing muscularity with an especially tight shirt. In this instance we see a complex layering of forms of cognition and practice that render action irreducible to dichotomous terms.
Where Alex becomes particularly reflective about his appearance on account of a recent loss of muscle, some actors are so reflective about their self-presentation that they differentially manipulate their fronts in order to maximize their sexual capital between sexual partners and sexual fields. In the case below, Dennis observes the structure of desire of the fields within which he participates and then, like a chameleon, presents a corresponding front that articulates with it. While cultivating sexual capital to obtain desirable partners was the original impetus for this actor's front work (Goffman 1959 ), it appears that the ability to appeal to many different actors across different fields is now the principle objective and self-preparation is configured in a highly deliberate process of cognition that combines nonhabitual elements of practice with the habit of manipulating the appearance: But if manipulation of the front is rather easy for some, for others, it is a rather unnatural, time-consuming, alienated process. For instance, for the respondent below, obtaining a masculine-looking exterior is now part of an automatic cognitive process that involves habitual practices related to a careful gym regimen and wearing clothes that "conform" to the standards of the field. At the same time, these automatic and habitual practices are nestled within the larger project of "being masculine" and properly "embodying" his corporeal creation-a project that is anything but easy or intuitive, underscoring the deliberate cognitive work attendant to the presentation of self (Goffman 1959 ) in a sexual field. Put differently, here we see a highly reflective effort to cultivate not just the façade of masculinity, but what in Bourdieusian terms we might think of as "hexis" (Bourdieu 1998 ). Only then, he reasons, will he become "sexually viable" I do a lot of things to give myself the signs of conformity, such as trying to wear clothes to some degree that resonates with the scene. And to a large part actually, alter my body, my physical being . . . to conform with the standards, to make myself more sexually viable . . . I mean, I [have] become very interested in fitness, in altering my body to conform to the ideal of masculinity . . . I mean masculinity is a big thing. It's almost been a struggle to embody masculinity. . . . It means going to the gym, working out. I'm trying to get bigger, trying to get more masculine. . . . Because all along I felt so disembodied. (Bradley, 32 years old, white)
In short, sexual stratification produces endogenous structural pressures that lead actors to think both deliberately and automatically, and to act both habitually and nonhabitually. Such individual-level forms of cognition and practice arise in the context of the routine practices of a sexual field. Below, we turn to an arena of high cuisine to illustrate further the significance of internally constituted structural pressures in a very different context.
THINKING ABOUT FOOD: COGNITION AND PRACTICE IN A CULINARY FIELD
A field of high cuisine is a social space constituted by elite chefs who orient their actions toward one another as they compete for customers and struggle for status within a bounded geographic location. 23 To the extent that high-end restaurants within a given locale share a limited customer base, elite chefs often look to what other chefs in the same city are doing to ensure that they remain competitive (Leschziner 2007a ; see also Durand 2003, 2005) . Unlike fields in which actors orient their actions toward individuals who may be geographically distant (e.g., in academia) chefs orient their actions toward their local peers. 24 But they do not compete with any local peer. Chefs at elite restaurants do not need to know what others at diners, fast food establishments, or "ethnic" restaurants do, as they do not orient their decisions around the actions of these individuals (see Leschziner 2007b Leschziner , 2010 ; see also Rao et al. 2005) . 25 Thus, we take chefs working at elite restaurants in New York City and San Francisco, the case studies upon which we draw here, to constitute two culinary fields. 26 A culinary field is organized around the production of goods (dishes) with symbolic value and work that is invariably commercial, financially costly, and risky. That is, whereas chefs must serve food with creative appeal to obtain symbolic capital, they can only "play the game" and remain in the field if they also ensure that their restaurants are profitable (Leschziner 2010; Rao et al. 2005) .
It takes many years of hard work to become an executive chef at an elite restaurant, especially in cities such as New York and San Francisco. Once obtaining this prestigious position, chefs have considerable investment in "the game" as well as in the specific social positions they occupy in the field. To maintain (or improve) such positions, they have to find a balance between conformity with the work of their peers and originality to stand out in the market (see Peterson 1997; Phillips and Zuckerman 2001) . For these purposes, elite chefs monitor the field closely, seeking information from their environment to make choices about a whole range of factors, namely, the food, cost, decor, service, and wine program (Leschziner 2007a (Leschziner , 2010 . If there is an economic recession and peers at similar restaurants respond by lowering prices or offering special deals, elite chefs are likely to emulate these practices in their own restaurants (cf. DiMaggio and Powell 1983) . Beyond keeping up with peers, they seek to gain a competitive edge on the market, reading food publications, surfing the Web, and traveling for the sole purpose of dining and obtaining ideas that will distinguish them from other chefs in their field (Leschziner 2007a) .
To be sure, not all chefs face the same pressures. Where those at four-star restaurants (the highest number awarded by the New York Times and San Francisco Chronicle, obtained by only a handful of establishments) face the greatest pressures to demonstrate consistent excellence, chefs at two-star restaurants face the greatest pressures to differentiate themselves from others, as they must distinguish themselves from chefs at numerous comparable restaurants, as well as from those below and above them. By the same token, a chef who has worked at a well-established restaurant need not monitor peers as closely as a chef who recently opened a restaurant. Similarly, someone who has held a chef's position in New York for a long time, having more accumulated knowledge and confidence in his own skills, experiences less pressure to monitor others closely than more junior counterparts.
Because chefs face different types and degrees of pressures, some are especially encouraged to be deliberate in their work, whereas others act more automatically without putting in jeopardy their positions. Whether chefs will be more or less deliberate is to a large extent determined by the pressures they face given the positions they occupy in the culinary field, positions they attain through their culinary styles, the status of the restaurants where they work, and their social connections (Leschziner 2010 (Leschziner , 2011 . Nevertheless, even in structurally secure positions (e.g., a well-established restaurant serving traditional food), some chefs will go out of their way to make regular changes to their menus. These chefs are more likely to think deliberately and act nonhabitually than those who, in similarly secure positions, are more complacent at their job and do the minimum required to keep customers satisfied and their restaurants afloat.
AUTOMATIC COGNITION AND HABITUAL PRACTICE IN A CULINARY FIELD
Like any culinary field, the New York City and San Francisco fields are constituted by chefs who have different levels of status and culinary styles and who work in restaurants with budgets, facilities, and staffs that vary significantly. Yet culinary fields have certain inherent structural pressures that affect all actors, including the need to make products that are creative yet also familiar, and the tension between the artistry of culinary creation and its commercial nature (Leschziner 2007a; Peterson 1997; Phillips and Zuckerman 2001) . Given the characteristics of culinary fields and the kinds of tasks that constitute chefs' jobs-ranging from mechanical actions in cooking to the creation of new dishes and strategic decisions to manage the business-cognition and practice take varying forms across different parts of the job as well as in the changing circumstances in chefs' careers.
Regardless of their particular circumstances, all chefs perform tasks in the kitchen that are largely reliant on a repertoire of automatic actions. Arguably, the latter are all but required to cook multiple dishes to order during the rush of lunch or dinner service, when there is simply no time to think. Indeed, cooking tends to become so automatic that some chefs remark that they turn into robots in the kitchen. Yes this is not entirely due to the demands of lunch or dinner service. Rather, it is because chefs are wont to perform the same tasks over and over again in the kitchen, and years of repeated practice turn these tasks into dispositions. 27 Whereas most chefs develop a repertoire of actions in food preparation that became second nature, they vary in how they cognitively approach food. When conceiving dishes, chefs draw on a host of widely shared ideas about the ingredients that pair well together (and those that do not) and the techniques that are best used with given foodstuffs. Yet some of them create dishes with little awareness that they rely on shared ideas. The variance in chefs' cognitive approach to food is associated, as we suggested above, with their field positions. A well-established chef at a high-end restaurant who has cooked in the same traditional culinary style for years, such as the individual below, is more likely to conceptualize cooking in a relatively automatic way than a young chef trying to find his way in the field and seeking to innovate on traditional styles. 28 How I came to this [pairing lamb with couscous], how I came to this. That's very classical but it's a little bit different. You get roast, roast, and braised. How I came to do this, because I really love lamb, and lamb goes well with couscous. It's a fact. I didn't invent anything. (Chef at a high-status restaurant in New York City) 29 It is precisely because the pairing of lamb and couscous is ostensibly so well known (both are common in North African countries and typically served together) that the chef is no longer able to explain why it is a good combination; that is, it has an appeal that can be experienced as intuitive and can be evaluated through a quick, hot judgment (see Haidt 2001) . This is not to be taken to mean that learning and appreciating well-established ideas are, by definition, automatic processes, but rather that after being learned and relied upon routinely, these ideas can be applied without requiring deliberate cognition. By contrast, pairing lamb with salmon roe, an unusual combination, would have to be deliberately considered and tested to assess whether it makes a good dish. In both instances, chefs would rely on a combination of automatic and deliberative cognition, but whereas automaticity would be especially salient in the former instance, deliberative thinking would predominate in the latter. Beyond having incorporated certain categories for thinking about food to the degree that they become dispositional, the interviewee cited above, like many other chefs, takes a stand against a conscious, deliberate reliance on such categories to conceive of food, a viewpoint he explains as follows:
When you are eating, you are eating to nourish yourself, to enjoy yourself. Don't get "How much of this, too much salt here." That is bull. That is bull. . . . You think that my grandmother was worried about "It's crunchy, it's sour, and it's sweet"? You think she was worried about this? She didn't know. And she tasted, and she liked it and she saw the family liking it and she said "That's it. It's agreement." That's all. The fact that guys go "It's sweet, sour, it's crunchy." You know, I really don't want to be too accusing on this one, but there's a lot of those American chefs who . . . You know, if you listen to Emeril Lagasse when he cooks, does he say "sweet," "sour"? No, he doesn't. He says "Hey, that's good, you know." That's what he says. And that's the intellect, really, that's the intellect really ruin it. (Chef at a high-status restaurant in New York City) Ironically, this chef's stance against a deliberative approach to food is deliberative itself. As a high-status chef with a long career cooking food in a relatively similar style without seeking to create novel ingredient combinations or use innovative cooking techniques, he can rely on well-established categories subconsciously and experience his approach to cooking as second nature. While this particular approach to cooking was originally a desire, and a choice, it has become habitual. The processes whereby he conceives of food and designs dishes are generally neither intellectual nor the result of an extensive cognitive evaluation but, quite the contrary, a function of a gut-level sensation about whether the combination of ingredients tastes good or not. Indeed, here is the instantaneous, automatic, hot cognition of a disposition, formerly constituted as a culinary convention but now internalized as a deep intuition.
DELIBERATE, NONHABITUAL, ROUTINE PRACTICE IN A CULINARY FIELD
In contrast to actors with long-term, established positions in the field, those in the early stages of their careers encounter conditions that encourage deliberate approaches to cooking. On one hand, chefs with less experience are less likely to have internalized culinary conventions and actions in the kitchen to the point of experiencing them as intuitions. On the other hand, they have more incentives to think deliberately and act nonhabitually in the process of developing distinctive culinary styles that stand out in a competitive market and establish their name in the field. In short, such chefs are likely to approach cooking through processes that combine a degree of automaticity with a higher reliance on deliberate cognition in a context that, while routine at the level of the field, is nonhabitual at the level of the actor.
The following quotation from a relatively young individual who had recently obtained his first job as executive chef at an upper-middle-status restaurant in New York, and had yet to build a reputation, provides a good illustration. This individual takes an acutely deliberate approach to cognizing food, consciously considering the categories that bound his thinking when he designs dishes:
Like this barramundi dish, it's like a papaya gazpacho, tamarind, yogurt, marcona almonds, but also has bacalao in it. And I was walking through the Essex Market here, and there are lots of Spanish ingredients, and the papaya smells really good and I said "Wow." And I also thought about tomatoes, tomatoes are now starting to come into season. And I thought of gazpacho and I thought "Why not do gazpacho with it?" So I did that. And I needed something creamy, and I needed something crunchy. So I put almonds. Something salty. So I think about Spanish, and how Spanish use bacalao. I put candied lemons in there. It's got yogurt, I put it in cans and make a foam out of that. I don't know if you've ever seen that before. What else? The sopressata for a little meaty, and sopressata oil in there. . . . I think about textures, I think about . . . the sweetness. What level do I want to be higher? Do I want more heat? And I'll . . . and it all balances off of each other. (Chef at an upper-middle-status restaurant in New York City) Not only does this respondent rely on deliberate cognition and a highly reflective consideration of a swath of food categories to conceive innovative dishes, he also delineates lines of action in his cooking practices that are nonhabitual for him. Indeed, chefs such as this one are often invested in challenging established food categories (see Leschziner 2006; Leschziner and Dakin 2011) . The following quotation from a young chef at an upper-middle-status restaurant in New York shows another example of how those with relatively short tenures at restaurants with considerable status deliberately develop lines of action to respond to the structural pressures they face, and create dishes through a combination of deliberate cognition and an automatic reliance on institutionalized ideas: Innovation, as a chef, we strive to, I strive to be innovative and be creative. There are 21,000 restaurants in New York City, you have to have, you have to be different, you have to, because if you're not, you're just not going to be in for, people are not going to come down to your restaurant. So in a way you have to be innovative and you have to know what your customer wants. Once you have that, you're going to be very successful. So we try to do a little bit of both, we try to be innovative, and we also, we learn, we know our customers, we get to know what they like and then feed them exactly what they like. (Chef at an upper-middle-status restaurant in New York City)
Trying to be innovative and offering his customers what they like is precisely the structural pressure to which this chef responds by designing a menu that has unusual twists along with traditional items and classical preparations. While a bit older and with a longer tenure at the restaurant than the individual cited previously, this chef still has to make a name for himself to ensure a successful career in the field. In short, deliberate attempts to create innovative food are characteristic of a phase in a chef's career that is nonhabitual for the individual, but routine at the level of the field.
Attempts to create innovative food are what Dewey ([1939] 1967:43; see also Whitford 202:338) calls an end-in-view. In contrast to the conceptualization of goals as well-defined values driving instrumental action associated with rational action theory, Dewey regards ends as indissociable from means and the local conditions from which they arise. In this way, while thinking deliberately and acting nonhabitually to create innovative dishes is an end for a chef, it also operates as a means to the extent that, combined with the automatic and habitual approaches that have become second nature to him, it guides his line of action. Means and ends, automatic and deliberate cognition, and habitual and nonhabitual practices thus combine in a complex, nuanced interplay.
Chefs at different stages in their careers face other kinds of structural pressures. For instance, a renowned chef who has worked at high-end restaurants for years and now wishes to open his own establishment serving more casual food faces the pressures that come from customers' expectations for a certain culinary style, and even for particular signature dishes. Such a chef is likely to create new dishes that blend the refined cuisine for which he is known with the casual style he had envisioned for the new restaurant, combining the automatic cognition and habitual practices that developed over years of working on high-end dishes with deliberate thinking and nonhabitual practices to move toward a simpler style.
Data such as these demonstrate that chefs at any stage of their careers and in any work conditions face situations that, while routine at the level of the field, lead them to think deliberately and develop nonhabitual lines of action alongside more automatic forms of cognition and habitual practices. This is not merely the result of field pressures but the layering of automatic and deliberate cognition that we should expect to find in most habitual and nonhabitual lines of action. Just as deliberative cognition relies on some automatic processes, and can become automatic and habitual itself, automatic cognition and habitual action are not reducible to dispositional action but rather involve a solidification of desires and choices, and a commitment to a course of action (see Dewey [1922 Dewey [ ] 2002 .
Chefs face unexpected situations in their work, go through different phases in their careers, move from one restaurant to another, and move from one field position to another. Even during settled times (Swidler 1986) , they regularly face changing conditions that make automatic thinking and habitual practices ineffective, thus encouraging deliberate cognition and nonhabitual practices (DiMaggio 1997). For instance, a chef may run a restaurant with a successful formula, but if there is an economic recession, she will have to respond to new conditions in ways that are not habitual for her. That field conditions change regularly and actors are encouraged to think deliberately in response, are characteristics that are not particular to cuisine, as we have argued, but rather the product of the normal dynamics of fields.
Below, we revisit these issues in broader theoretical terms, drawing out the implications of our two case studies to further the understanding of cognition and action in field theory.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: THINKING BEYOND FOOD AND SEX
Bourdieu's field theory is, as its core, a theory of practice (Ortner 1984) and one that advanced what for many is an inspired resolution to the duality of agency and structure. For as Bourdieu reasoned, the structures of the mind and the structures of the social world represent two "orders" that, while objectively distinct, are nevertheless recursively co-constitutive (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) . As such, in Bourdieusian sociology, and field theory more broadly, the minds of agents do not precede social structure but, rather, emerge as an objectification of it in the form of the durable and transposable dispositions of the "habitus" (Bourdieu 1977 (Bourdieu , [1979 (Bourdieu ] 1984 . These dispositions, being subconscious and embodied, powerfully organize cognition and practice such that agents act in the world effectively, even virtuosically, in a manner that requires little of the calculating rational self-interest proposed by rational action theory. And this is precisely the point: the Bourdieusian actor appeals to social theorists because she is an effective, socially situated agent whose practice bears the imprint of social structure but without the overly socialized or excessively instrumentalist cognitive processes proposed by socialization theorists or economists, respectively.
But perhaps the subconscious, Bourdieusian dispositional actor, and the model of practice upon which field theory is based, represents less a final resolution than one, unsustainable end point of the swing of a pendulum. Indeed, to the extent that field research has been trained on automatic, dispositional cognitive processes, it glosses or ignores altogether the active, reflective dimensions of cognition that underpin practice (i.e., the "thinking" component of practice). Surely the emphasis on subconscious disposition goes a long way to rectify shortcomings in previous models of practice, but at the same time it runs the risk of producing yet another impoverished account of cognition and action. In this article, we are not proposing the reintroduction of deliberate thinking at the expense of automatic cognition. Instead, we are questioning the very terms of the debate wherein cognition and practice are theorized to be either reflective and nonhabitual or automatic and habitual. In short, while we do not dispute that cognition and practice may, depending on the situation, be rooted disproportionately in automatic or deliberate processes, we believe that theorizing from the outset a dichotomous model does a great disservice to understanding how cognition works in practice, not least because such a model occludes what may be most sociologically interesting in theorizing action.
To make this point, we draw from data on cognition in two quite distinct contexts, the sexual field and the field of high cuisine. Whereas the latter is an occupational field organized by formal positions and highly institutionalized systems of evaluation, the former is organized as a kind of collective sexual life with no formal structures or pathways, no institution conferring credibility or status, and placement in social space with far less stability. Indeed, in a sexual field, a bad hair day can diminish one's status, at least temporarily, whereas the same can hardly be said for an elite chef. Nevertheless, despite their differences, these fields are similar to the extent that they foster processes of cognition and practice that are irreducible to subconscious disposition on one hand or conscious deliberation on the other. That instances of action that bring together automatic and deliberate cognition are common across them underscores the point that fields, by their very nature, produce structural pressures that facilitate both forms of cognition irrespective of the particular substance and organizational configuration of any given field. Such structural pressures militate against a wholly automatic, dispositional cognitive process and constitute precisely the social contexts in which the "thinking" part of cognition, and the interplay between automatic and deliberate cognition, is likely to occur.
In light of our argument, we believe that a stratified or "dual" model of cognition, while useful for analytically parsing through distinct components of practice, nevertheless imposes an impoverished conception of action that produces a reductionist understanding of practice. Indeed, the notion that cognition may be both automatic and deliberate, and that the conditions of social life will shape their relative preponderance, is an idea with increasing rhetorical support across a variety of sociological approaches (Archer 2010; Cerulo 2006 Cerulo , 2010 DiMaggio 1997 DiMaggio , 2002 Elder Vass 2007; Giddens 1979; Lizardo and Strand 2010; Martin 2010; Swidler 1986 Swidler , 2001 Vaisey 2008a Vaisey , 2008b Vaisey , 2009 but one that has yet to show their interplay in field theory for any given practice. Rather, to date, the analysis of practice in field theory has tended to rest on the Bourdieusian, dispositional actor, and automaticity and deliberation have been situated as oppositional modes of cognition that can be assigned in an either/or fashion. Vaisey (2009) , for instance, argues for a dual-process model of cognition wherein the relative preponderance of each form of consciousness depends, in any given case, on the "demands of social interaction" (p. 1687). Nevertheless to illustrate the stratified nature of consciousness, Vaisey borrows the metaphor of an elephant and a rider from Haidt (2005) , where the elephant represents practical consciousness, and the rider discursive consciousness. Not surprisingly, as the metaphor suggests, the dual-process model for Vaisey tends to reduce to a Bourdieusian model of automatic cognition wherein the elephant, by dint of its sheer size and power, drives the ride (i.e., discursive consciousness is all but relegated to a theoretical possibility). This is not entirely surprising given the disciplinary origins of the dual-process model in experimental research on social cognition (see Bargh 1994; Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Haidt 2001 Haidt , 2005 Lieberman 1997 ). But it is precisely for this reason that we urge caution when privileging so strongly a dual-process model that dichotomizes automatic and deliberate cognition. For because laboratory experiments do not situate actors in the context of real-world conditions, including the structural field pressures highlighted in this article, the findings from experimental cognitive research simply cannot weigh in on the relationship of automatic to deliberate cognition across social settings. 30 Certainly the findings of the present article suggest that social context will bear on modes of cognition in ways that may be otherwise obscured by laboratory research.
Moving forward, to better understand how individuals undertake actions in a field, we would do well to liberate our theories of action from the chains of a dichotomous framework, which limit our capacity to understand the ways in which automatic and deliberate cognition, and habitual and nonhabitual action, combine fluidly to inform paths of action. Furthermore, the dichotomous framework typically entails an understanding of action as a singular unit. However, actions are not self-standing units, each constituted by distinct means and ends, as pragmatists have rightly noted (Dewey [1939 (Dewey [ ] 1967 (Dewey [ , [1922 2002), but rather instances embedded in a stream of actions, wherein ends are never just ends, but may operate as means for directing action and means for further ends (Dewey, [1939 (Dewey, [ ] 1967 Whitford 2002:37-38) . Individuals shape one action after the other, building on desires, needs, skills, and resources obtained in and through previous actions (cf . Swidler 1986) . Thus, means and ends are not ontologically separate components of action but rather two instances that differ only temporally.
We suggest drawing on a pragmatist conceptualization of action because we believe it provides the tools to develop a more expansive understanding of action that avoids the perils of seeing either rational action that follows externally imposed ends (as in rational action theory) or dispositional action that follows the subconscious cognitive schema of the habitus (as in field theory and sociological approaches inspired in the dual-process model of cognition). From a pragmatist viewpoint, we can explain action that may be purposive, without assuming that it follows ends that are separate from the conditions of action, as well as action that is driven by an end, but with no clear sense of how to achieve it (see Winship 2004) . And, finally, one must not forget the all too common day-to-day action in a field that unfolds with no clear end or purpose (Dewey ([1939 (Dewey ([ ] 1967 Withford 2002) .
Such a model, inspired by pragmatism, seeks to avoid a priori assumptions about the nature of action. Actors may have ideas about what they want to do, but they respond to particular situations in their environment when undertaking actions. Insofar as they develop paths of action in response to particular contextual conditions, their goals, dispositions, and habits will also change in response to social context. By examining the ways in which actors "muddle along" and take one action after another, combining deliberation with automatic thinking, and habitual and creative action, we can better address the "thinking problem" in field theory. As we showed in our case studies, this approach paves the way to explain the conditions that may encourage the preponderance of one type of cognition and action or another.
Similarly, the model we propose enables us to address the "problem of change" in field theory, for once we understand that practice in a field may be purposive but not necessarily rational, that individuals may act with no clear road map (lacking either clear ends or knowledge of the right means), and that they may think and act in ways that combine different forms of cognition and practice, we can begin to understand how cognition and action establish the possibilities of field change. That is, we can begin to explain how field change can arise not just from external forces that cause an upheaval of previously settled lives but also from the actions of field members who, in the context of the routine practices of the field, act in ways that fail to reproduce it. 31 Indeed, if individuals think both automatically and deliberately, and if fields facilitate the former but also encourage the latter, we can expect that some actors, on occasion, will act in ways that depart from or go against the grain of the prevailing paths of action, whether they do it purposively, by accident, or by virtue of actions that combine means and ends in new ways. In some of these instances, these practices will gain traction, producing new, shared ways of approaching old situations (see Herrigel 2008) . Such innovations may, over time, become institutionalized, to constitute habitual practices and, eventually, new dispositions. In short, here is a process of field change catalyzed by small-scale transformations internal to the field. Hence, by addressing the "thinking problem" in field theory, sociologists will incorporate into their analysis a critical agent of change (i.e., the actors that populate the field itself). But this will surely require thinking beyond food and sex, and thinking in deliberate and reflective ways to prevent the schemas of dispositional action from becoming an automatic epistemological disposition among scholars of the field.
NOTES
1. This is not to imply that field members are by definition strategic in their actions. Neither is it to suggest that actors are necessarily aware of the forces that may inform their actions, nor that they re-cognize the field with each and every action. Rather, the point is to highlight cognitive processes required for social fields to act as fields. 2. We refer to neoinstitutionalism in sociology and organizational analysis here because, together with Bourdieu's field theory, it is a paradigmatic case of the overemphasis of automatic cognition at the expense of more reflective dimensions of thinking. 3. For a more general critique of the treatment of habitual routine practice in sociological theory, see Archer (2010) .
4. See Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012b) for a related point with respect to collective action in fields. 5. For a discussion of Fligstein and McAdam's (2011) arguments, see Goldstone and Useem (2012) and Fligstein and McAdam's (2012a) response. 6. Where Bourdieu observes (what could be conceived as) "internally wrought" field change, he identifies this change either as a consequence of the influx of new players, and the resulting change in competition and rewards (Bourdieu [1997 (Bourdieu [ ] 2000 or as a result of processes of cultural imitation (Bourdieu [1979 (Bourdieu [ ] 1984 . We suggest a broader set of internal processes conducive to field change that emerge in practices that are routine at the level of the field. We thereby expand the possibilities for field change from the inside out. 7. Fligstein and McAdam (2011) make the same observation regarding the problem of explaining change in field theory. To rectify this problem, Fligstein and McAdam note both the possibility of internally and externally driven change, though their focus here is on those sources that are external to the field. 8. There exists a significant sociological literature on deliberation as a form of collective problem solving Winship 1999, 2003; Gibson 2012; Winship 2004) , but this literature analyzes decision making as a collective enterprise and is therefore outside the scope of our examination of individual cognitive processes in a field. 9. For an application of the "dual-process" model to sociology, see Vaisey (2008a Vaisey ( , 2008b Vaisey ( , 2009 ) and Lizardo and Strand (2010) . 10. While our focus on deliberate cognition runs parallel with recent insights from the reflexivity literature (Archer 2010; Wiley 2010) , we suggest that this latter conception of action tends to consolidate rather than disentangle a dichotomous conception of action as rooted in either dispositional or deliberate cognition. 11. In this article, we draw on Bourdieu's concept of the specific habitus, as opposed to the original habitus. Whereas the original habitus refers to those schemas and dispositions acquired in childhood as a function of socialization in the family (Bourdieu [1979 (Bourdieu [ ] 1984 , the specific habitus refers to a schema that develops in the context of one's position in a field where one seeks to be a player (Bourdieu [1997] 2000:99-100). 12. We must also note, however, that the emphasis on social reproduction weakened over Bourdieu's career. Whereas his earlier books emphasized the role of social structure (see Bourdieu 1977 Bourdieu , [1979 1984), his later worked moved closer to practice (see Bourdieu 1998) . 13. The conceptualization of schemas we present here is associated with the connectionist model of cognition (see Neisser 1967; Rumelhart 1980 ). 14. The argument that reasoning is not used to motivate action but to justify it has indeed been raised to critique the toolkit theory of action (Swidler 1986 (Swidler , 2001 ). See Lizardo and Strand (2010) , Martin (2010) , and Vaisey (2008a Vaisey ( , 2008b Vaisey ( , 2009 ). 15. See Archer (2010) for a historical critique of Bourdieu's concept of habitus and the more general problem of contemporary explanations of cognition and practice that rely too heavily on disposition. 16. Much current research in cognitive psychology shows that classifying all cognition into two separate categories (most typically, automatic and deliberate, or system 1 and system 2), as dual-process models do, is untenable for two main reasons: (1) many acts of cognition combine the two cognitive processes, and (2) what is referred to as automatic cognition or system 1 encompasses many modes of cognition that are too different in nature to be lumped together into one category. For critiques of dual-process models, see Evans (2006 Evans ( , 2012 Frank, Cohen, and Sanfey (2009); Glöckner (2008) ; Macchi and Bagassi (2012); and Roser and Gazzaniga (2004) . 17. See Elder-Vass (2007) for a critique of Bourdieu's theory along similar lines. Of particular relevance here is Elder-Vass's (2007:340) claim that reasons are partial and contingent causes of individuals' actions in that they codetermine individuals' decisions, the latter of which are stored as neural networks in the brain (i.e., dispositions) and in turn codetermine actions. 18. Without a doubt, conditions in actual practice cannot be neatly sorted into schematic categories but rather fall somewhere in a continuum. As we note below, pragmatist insights regarding the relationship between habitual and nonhabitual practice may be particularly helpful in explaining this (e.g., see Dewey [1922] 2002). 19. Cognition may become automatic not only on account of subconscious dispositions but also because of environmental scaffolding that elicits particular patterns of cognition and lines of action. In this sense, one may make a finer distinction in automatic cognition beyond the distinctions we focus on in the present article-one that draws from either or, simultaneously, both, subconscious schemas and environmental cues in the course of delineating a line of action (DiMaggio 1997) . For more on the role of environmental scaffolding on cognition, see Hutchins (1995) and Lave (1988) ; for explicitly sociological analysis of the relationship of cognition and the physical environment, see Beunza and Stark (2012) 35 years and older, who find leather apparel erotic. "Bears" are gay "average Joes" (Hennen 2008) , hirsute, stocky, dressed in working-class, masculine clothing styles and hiking boots or nondescript tennis shoes. "Twinks" are white gay men, in their mid-20s or younger, with lean builds, fashionable urban clothing, hip, pricey footwear, and well-coiffed hairdos. "Jocks" are gay men in their 20s to early 40s with athletic to very muscular bodies who sport a masculine affect. 22. This is not to imply that deliberate cognition was not present at an earlier time but simply to say that, once established, self-presentation may follow an inculcated disposition that no longer requires active cognition. These data were supplemented with individuals in other occupational ranks in the kitchen, as well as persons in other occupations in the restaurant world, including restaurant managers, servers, designers, and purveyors. Elite chefs, as categorized here, are those who work in restaurants that have been awarded between one and four stars (the maximum) in the New York Times, and are classified as either expensive or very expensive, and three or four stars in San Francisco Chronicle, classified as either expensive or very expensive in the magazine San Francisco. 24. To be sure, chefs are not insulated from the world of cuisine beyond their local environments. For one thing, they look to other culinary fields to obtain new ideas (hence their regular travels to eat abroad). But they do not orient their actions to the actions of chefs in other fields; rather, they may draw on these chefs' ideas to respond to the actions of chefs in their own field and remain competitive. In addition, though chefs may own restaurants in multiple locations, they adapt their restaurants to the local "rules of the game," which undoubtedly vary field by field, and orient their actions to what their local peers do to ensure success. 25. The category "ethnic" is here understood phenomenologically, after chefs' views. That chefs at elite restaurants do not need to know what others at "ethnic" restaurants do, because they do not orient their actions to these others, means that "ethnic" restaurants are not members of the field of high cuisine. 26. This definition departs from extant conceptualizations of the field of cuisine (Ferguson 1998 (Ferguson , 2004 Rao et al. 2003) , which include more actors and institutions (namely, food critics and writers, producers, and consumers) as well as larger geographical spaces, generally encompassing an entire country. It must be noted, however, that these conceptualizations are based on Ferguson's (1998) foundational definition of a "gastronomic field," a social space that encompasses much more than the world of restaurants. We conceive of a culinary field in the more narrow way presented here. 27. Such dispositions are, in turn, sustained by being regularly enacted (see Bourdieu 1998) . 28. Names of chefs and restaurants are not used because interviews have been kept anonymous and confidential. 29. Restaurants have been classified into three status categories namely, middle, upper-middle, and high status. 30. With regard to laboratory-based cognitive research, we suggest that the conditions of a field and the conditions of a laboratory setting are two significantly different contexts that cannot be reduced to the same, lest we treat an apple as an orange. There are reasons to believe that the kind of split-second decision making that laboratory experiments or closed-ended survey questions elicit (i.e., "hot cognition") is qualitatively different from the kinds of cognitive processes in a field wherein actors are highly invested in the stakes of the field, where their actions are highly consequential for their lives, and where decision making, by and large, is not split second but, on the contrary, evolves over a different metric of time. At the same time, we recognize that using interview data to discern forms of cognition carries with it its own set of methodological perils-for instance, when asked to account for their actions, interview subjects may have the tendency to articulate a degree of deliberateness not reflected in the action itself. This potential problem may be circumvented by eliciting responses to questions concerning "how" actions were taken rather than why they were taken. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that respondents sometimes demonstrate automatic cognition even when they are asked to justify their actions, as in those cases when respondents convey the absence of a specific rationale for their actions. 31. See Herrigel (2008) for a very good example of how field change can occur through a combination of habitual and nonhabitual action and purposeful and nonpurposeful action.
